UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

In Re: Levaquin Products)
Liability Litigation,)

) File No. 08-md-1943

(JRT/AJB)

)

Minneapolis, Minnesota

May 26, 2009 11:15 A.M.

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BEFORE THE HONORABLE **JOHN R. TUNHEIM**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

(DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL - VIA TELEPHONE)

APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiffs: RONALD S. GOLDSER, ESQ.

LEWIS J. SAUL, ESQ. KEVIN FITZGERALD, ESQ.

For the Defendant: **JAMES DAMES, ESQ.**

WILLIAM H. ROBINSON, JR., ESQ. TRACY J. VAN STEENBURGH, ESQ.

Court Reporter: KRISTINE MOUSSEAU, CRR-RPR

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Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript produced by computer.

1 11:15 A.M 2. (In open court via telephone.) 3 THE COURT: Okay. You may be seated. We are on 4 the telephone today. Counsel, would you note your 5 appearances by telephone today in civil case number 08-1943, In Re: Levaquin Products Liability Litigation. 6 7 MR. SAUL: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Lewis Saul, L-e-w-i-s, S, as in Sam, a-u-l, for the 8 9 plaintiffs. 10 MR. GOLDSER: Good morning, Your Honor. 11 Goldser for plaintiffs. Thank you for accommodating us by 12 telephone today. 13 MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, Kevin Fitzgerald 14 also for plaintiff. MR. DAMES: Good morning, Your Honor. John Dames 15 for defendants. 16 17 MS. VAN STEENBURGH: Tracy Van Steenburgh for 18 defendants. 19 MR. ROBINSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Bill 20 Robinson for the defendants. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. We have the 2.2 defendants' motion this morning to compel. The Court has reviewed the briefs that were submitted in advance. 23 24 Mr. Dames, are you making the argument here? 25 MR. DAMES: Yes, I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go right ahead.

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MR. DAMES: Since you have reviewed the briefs, I will be somewhat short on this, but it essentially involves a request, four requests, that seek the production of documents obtained by plaintiffs from governmental or regulatory bodies, domestic or foreign, relating either to levofloxacin and/or the defendants in this action.

In response to these four requests that were made, there were essentially two objections to it. One was based on work product privilege, and the second one was based on the fact that the claim that defendants either had the documents or they were equally accessible to the defendants as they were to plaintiffs.

The work product doctrine defendants contend is clearly inapplicable to the documents we seek. We seek the actual documents obtained from these foreign or domestic regulatory bodies. Those documents were clearly not prepared in anticipation of litigation, nor by or on behalf of plaintiffs or their counsel, and as such, are certainly not entitled to such protection.

Now, I understand plaintiffs are claiming a narrower universe for their protection, that is they argue that the selection that they made of those documents, in fact, the requesting selection itself would show their mental impressions and betray their work product.

Now, we have clearly not sought that. We do not seek what they actually requested. We seek the underlying documents themselves, but most importantly, that exception, the selection process employed, something that would signify what it is is a very, very narrowly drawn exception, and the burden is on the plaintiffs to establish their right for protection.

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And they have not met the burden by providing the Court any basis to make a decision as to how these documents that we seek would actually divulge those mental impressions. The cases are fairly specific about the fact that there must be some showing with some specificity. It cannot be an abstract claim or demand that plaintiffs make.

So there is no real basis for anyone to be able to determine the validity of plaintiffs' claim. Now, in addition, the argument is that we have the documents. We can go through in effect the same steps that plaintiffs did. I think our brief points out, that is not a valid basis. The courts have flatly disagreed with that claim as a basis to reject the need to produce documents.

I do want to raise, and I think frankly it's so clear, I won't spend any time on that, but I will spend some time on a claim being made by plaintiffs subsequent to I think the briefs being filed, and that is that we have objected to foreign regulatory documents. Therefore, how

can we with a straight face demand plaintiffs produce the very same documents that we have objected to in the past, although I think it not a legitimate response to our motion. At this point in time, I think it does, however, deserve a response by us.

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Number one, that objection on foreign regulatory documents was made in 2007. Subsequent to that time, the practice of the defendants in responding to discovery has in fact rendered that objection moot. Our witnesses have responded to questions concerning foreign regulatory actions.

We have described through our witnesses the fact that this product is marketed by us pursuant to an agreement with Daichi, and we do not have the right to market the product in Europe, nor in Asia, and in fact we do not communicate, and this has been described in the deposition. The company did not communicate with foreign regulatory action. That is the province of our partners pursuant to the marketing agreements.

The correspondence we have with the partners and whatever they have sent us concerning levofloxacin and actions by foreign regulatory agencies have been part of the discovery process we made without objection to plaintiffs. So there has already been examinations based upon French regulatory considerations, concerns on the part

of events as to what those actions might entail.

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I could go on from there, but quite simply, in practice, in responding to the issues in the case, we have determined that in fact we would not rest on that objection, and we had our witnesses respond to the, both the questions, and we responded with a document that we had in our possession from our partners that related to the foreign regulatory agencies.

We don't have direct communications or direct filings with any of them, and that is why we don't have documents from them directly. So -- and that's why I think it's worthy of telling the Court because I do think underlying so much that goes on in the case, even though there may not be a precise quid pro quo, it still deserves -- we needed to establish to the Court that we are not trying to be hypocritical or two-faced about this, but that's enough of that, I believe.

I think the, this response objecting based on work product, and I will just sum up, does not -- without more, there can be no ability for the Court to actually make concrete plaintiffs' abstract claim that producing the documents requested by defendants would somehow divulge their mental processes and impressions and strategies.

Nothing that we have requested requires any of that. Nothing plaintiffs have identified gives us a clue

as to what those might be, and frankly, I think the central case that we cite on the precise issue is Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation versus Wachovia Insurance Services of the March 19th, 2007, decision of the United States

District Court.

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The citation is in our brief, but there the precise issue concerning the selection process that the party from which discovery was sought made, there was no sufficient showing made in that case, much like in this case, to be able to have the Court rest a decision as to whether the claim and the burden have been sustained.

So if the Court has any questions, I would be happy to respond, but that's it for me.

THE COURT: Mr. Dames, hear me okay?

MR. DAMES: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I recognize your argument that it's not valid, the fact that these documents might be otherwise accessible, not a valid argument. I'm just wondering. Why are these documents not equally available to the defense through the normal sources of getting these documents?

MR. DAMES: Well, I suspect that since they are obtained from foreign regulatory agencies or domestic that we could submit an FOI request ourselves to those foreign regulatory agencies or to the FDA, seeking the universe of

documents they may have or that they produce.

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We decided to do it this way so that we would know what was provided, the whole universe of documents that were provided by the foreign regulatory agencies and/or the FDA in this manner. I'm not certain that we have to use the public manner versus the discovery manner in a proceeding.

I mean, I don't know that there is any requirement for our request that we proceed with the same public request made by plaintiffs ourselves to get those documents, but I don't deny that we could have done Freedom of Information Act requests. They are prolonged at this point, with the FDA can take a significant amount of time.

And I, frankly, I have to confess ignorance as to the steps needed to take to get documents from foreign regulatory agencies. I don't deny that we, too, could go to these bodies and make the appropriate requests. We might or might not get the same response, but that might be just the vagaries of bureaucratic inconsistencies, but we certainly could have done it. That is one way to do it.

THE COURT: But part of your response is, you would have, you would then know what had been provided to the plaintiffs. Doesn't that get at the possibility of discovering insight into initial litigation strategies which may at least in some way implicate the work product

privilege?

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MR. DAMES: I don't believe so, Your Honor, because that would be an exception then that would swallow the rule. That is, if plaintiffs can always avoid by making requests independently of the discovery process in court of any outside body, if they can cloak and protect themselves by suggesting that their request itself would betray or divulge some sort of mental process about the case, then we don't really have an exception anymore.

We just have a blanket privilege, and there is no way of knowing. We're not seeking the request itself or what they sent to the regulatory agency seeking the information. We're just seeking the actual documents, and I have this sneaking suspicion, and since I don't have the response, I guess it remains sneaking, that we will find that the universe of documents will not really give a clue, other than the broad subject matter of what was being sought, to any strategies themselves.

So any document divulged in discovery of one party to another somehow can't betray a certain amount of the strategies of the party producing those documents. I mean, I don't know how we can argue against their work product privilege with, based on what we have before us.

We don't even, we don't even know the category of documents that they have. We don't know the number of

documents that they're claiming privilege from. We don't,

I mean, we know nothing to make specific the broad claim of

privilege that they, that they make.

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And so it is, this argument right now becomes an abstract one, and I, you know, making arguments in the abstract are very difficult when you're seeking specific items in discovery. So I don't know how to respond to the Court other than, I guess in theory it's possible that an element of strategy can be divulged, but, you know, that's theoretical, and the cases have held that if it's theoretical, it remains insufficient.

THE COURT: One more question, Mr. Dames. Thank you. To the extent that there is a claim that there may be undue hardship to discover these documents on your own, so to speak, is it the cost and time involved in foreign litigation and the actual time involved in any type of contact with foreign regulatory authorities?

MR. DAMES: It's time more than cost.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DAMES: I don't know what the costs would be, so I'm uncomfortable with suggesting that there is some sort of prohibition of cost, and I just, through the phone lines I can sense that plaintiffs would suggest if they can afford the costs we can afford the costs, and they're probably right.

I think it's more the time element, but I also — this is not an attempt to entrap plaintiffs to divulge their mental processes, that we could have just gone off and done this ourselves but we have chosen a more devious method to get it from them so we would know, you know, what they were focusing on and it would give us some sort of indication of where they were heading.

That is certainly not the intent. I mean, I -it just isn't the intent. We want the universe of
documents that they obtained, and it's probably at this
point much quicker to get them from plaintiffs, and again,
I just repeat. There isn't an obligation to compel parties
to get documents from one method versus another method,
assuming that the -- each method is actually legitimate on
its own.

So we go back to whether the work product privilege is actually a valid privilege to invoke, but I'm not, I don't believe there is any requirement in the case law that we choose one method versus another.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Dames.

Mr. Saul?

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MR. SAUL: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. There is really nothing abstract here at all. What Mr. Dames does not say in his argument is why they need these documents.

I realize the burden shifts to us, but in this case from

the beginning when they asked for these documents, I asked myself why do they need these documents.

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The only reason that they need these documents are to look into our litigation strategy, not only what we obtained and what we know, but also to determine what we don't know, so they can form their litigation strategy.

This is an adversarial procedure. We requested these documents a year and a half or two ago, a year and a half to two years ago.

We did this after suit was filed. We did this in anticipation of litigation. This is our work product, and it does lay a road map, the documents that we obtained, as to our litigation strategy, and the defendants have not given one reason other than time for the need for these documents.

Now, to address the issue about that they don't have time to do it, they knew a year and a half or two years ago that we requested these documents because when we requested, I'm not going to say what agency, but from a particular agency in Europe these documents, the agency wrote to them telling them that we wanted these documents, do you have any objection to releasing them.

So this argument that Mr. Dames is making, and it's a good argument, he argues well, but I don't think it can carry the day that we didn't know about -- that it's a

time issue now that I don't think that that, that, that that should carry the day.

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Mr. Dames also cited a case in which we cited in our brief and said that it stood for the proposition that he brings forward, and that case was the case Federal Deposit Insurance Corp versus Wachovia, and in that, the court said, Whereas in the instant case, the documents sought already are in the possession of or are readily available to the party seeking them, the implication is that the request is being promulgated not to obtain relevant information but with a precise goal of learning what the opposing attorney is thinking or strategy may be, and that's exactly what they're doing here, Your Honor.

In fact, we have a motion that we will be filing shortly after we have the meet and confer, and I suggested to the Court during the last hearing that you might want to give them simultaneously to try to do it this way, but what has happened is, we can't get documents. So the defendants said, tell us what documents you want in preparation for doctor X's deposition, and we will find them for you.

So we have to tell them the documents. They go and look for them, and they know our strategy. This is another part of them attempting to learn our strategy. These documents are available to the defendants as they were to the plaintiffs.

In fact, in objections that the defendant filed in this case, they said the following. Objection number 8 in, in their objections to our discovery, Ortho-McNeil objects to any plaintiffs' discovery can be broadly construed to require us to search for and disclose information and documents that are a matter of public record or otherwise equally accessible to plaintiff as to Ortho-McNeil.

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The entire time they have been taking opposition notwithstanding Mr. Dames said that they testified to these. They have not given us these documents as far as we can tell, although we can't search the databases properly, but the bottom line here is that the reason they are seeking this information, they want to learn how we are approaching this case, what we know and what we don't know.

And these documents that we have, we intend to use them at trial. They're our work product. That's what the rules created were to allow the work product to stay that of the attorneys until the appropriate time, and we ask that their motion be denied.

THE COURT: Mr. Dames, anything else?

MR. DAMES: No, Your Honor, not really. I just, I guess I just, the only thing I would do is reiterate that the concern on the part of the Court in Wachovia about drawing the existence of the sport exception very narrowly,

and there in that case there was a number of documents selected by an attorney out of thousands of others and given to his client in preparation for the upcoming deposition, and the argument was the actual culling out of those documents and selecting only some of them to show to his client. Those were the mental impressions and thought processes of the attorney. That was more properly the existence of a work product protection privilege.

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We don't have that here. We haven't requested for something that plaintiffs from the universe of documents they have that cull out from them so that we would know from that universe which ones they precisely thought were important in their strategy of the case.

So all I can say is, again, I think we're left with a speculative basis upon which to rule in favor of the privilege based on the record the plaintiffs have presented the Court, and that's all I have.

THE COURT: Mr. Saul, did you have anything else?

MR. SAUL: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Counsel, for the arguments this morning. I am going to grant the defendants' motion to compel. Generally the Court is in favor of broad sharing of documents during the discovery process. It is particularly true in a case like this, and it applies equally to both sides.

I do think that having examined this matter carefully that the danger of revealing litigation strategy in a broadly worded request like this is somewhat slight. I don't find that this is protected by the work product privilege, and I do think there is some, albeit minor, but there is some savings of time, and that perhaps is a hardship at this stage of the litigation.

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The defense surely could have obtained these documents themselves. I don't see that they would have — they would have been inaccessible to the defense, but given the time factor which the Court is conscious of and the Court's belief that there is, there would be little if any litigation strategy revealed by production of these documents, the Court will grant the motion and remind the defense as well that the Court has a view that there should be broad sharing of documents during the discovery phase of this case.

Anything else for today from you, Mr. Dames?

MR. DAMES: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Saul?

MR. SAUL: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. We'll be in recess, and, Mr. Saul, did you indicate that you would be filing a motion to compel as well?

MR. SAUL: Yes. We will be filing an omnibus

1	motion to compel. It will be quite complicated and
2	involved, and we also, Your Honor, we don't think that we
3	can do the discovery necessary for the bellwether
4	plaintiffs in time to meet the discovery deadline, so we
5	will be bringing that issue to the Court's attention.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Very well. We will get that
7	on for a hearing either in person or by telephone, whatever
8	the parties prefer, just as quickly as we have all the
9	response and replies in. Okay?
10	MR. SAUL: Thank you, Your Honor.
11	MR. DAMES: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Okay. We will be in recess. Thank
13	you.
14	THE CLERK: All rise.
15	* * *
16	I, Kristine Mousseau, certify that the foregoing
17	is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in
18	the above-entitled matter.
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22	Certified by: <u>s/ Kristine Mousseau, CRR-RPR</u> Kristine Mousseau, CRR-RPR
23	KIISCINE MOUSSEAU, CKK-KFK
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